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Introduction

This paper argues
that similar to other
post-independence states,
South Africa
has
engaged in extensive
judicial and legislative
customary law reforms
that replicate colonial
relations and structures.
To do this, the paper is
divided into five sections. Section 1 establishes the historical context of customary law
within the mainstream
South African legal system, briefly discussing
Sanele Sibanda.
the relevant legislation
and its overarching purpose. In section 2, the paper moves
on to look at the provisions of the Constitution that relate to
customary law and, more generally, the importance of the right
to culture as the constitutional premise of inclusion of customary law. Section 3 discusses Mamdani’s thesis of decentralized
despotism and its importance as an analytical tool for assessing
how customary law is developing in a democratic South Africa.

he democratic dispensation in South Africa brought
hope and expectations to African communities that had
been marginalized from the mainstream of the country’s
dual legal system. Although officially dubbed a “dual system,”1
African customary law was subordinated to the position of the
tolerated but unloved stepchild. The transformation of South
Africa from a racist, colonial, and subsequently apartheid state2
to an inclusive, democratic, and constitutional state ushered in
an era of possibilities widely perceived as breathing new life into
customary law. The Constitution recognizes customary law as
one of the “foundation[s] of the South African legal system” by
placing it on par with the common law.3
During the fifteen years since commencement of the democratic dispensation, much has been done in the name of reforming and integrating customary law in order to make it comport
with South Africa’s constitutional project. Without a precise prescription as to what form a constitutionally compliant customary
law regime would take, scholars have portrayed the process of
incorporation and reform as a delicate balancing act, seeking to
promote customary law’s cultural uniqueness as an indigenous
African enterprise, whilst vigorously protecting and promoting
women’s right to equality in order to blunt the impact of a seemingly endemic patriarchy.4 How effectively, or even whether, this
has been achieved remains an open question.

In section 4, the paper reflects upon some of the substantive
and institutional developments in customary law in the current
dispensation, and argues that recent reforms to customary law
are not encouraging. Referring to specific examples, the paper
illustrates two ways in which the state has failed to reform customary law: firstly, in a way that promotes the right to culture
upon which it is based; and secondly, in a way that democratizes
traditional institutions such as the courts to ensure that they
protect and promote the interests of the communities they serve.
The final section concludes by raising concerns about the potential for current reforms to leave people living under customary
law to be treated as subjects and not citizens.

This paper argues that over the last fifteen years, instead of
producing a reformed, democratic, and culturally attuned system
of customary law as envisaged at the time of its constitutional
incorporation, reformers have reproduced the colonial legacy
that again relegates customary law to a second-tier legal system
and an instrument of rule and administration. In support of this
argument, the paper refers to Professor Mahmood Mamdani’s
thesis that despite post-independence states’ honest attempts to
reform customary legal systems, many only managed to reproduce the colonial legacy through an administratively driven justice system characterized by a state form he terms “decentralized
despotism.”5

History of Customary Law under the
Black Administration Act
The year 1927 marked a notorious milestone in the history
of customary law in South Africa; it was the year the Black
Administration Act (BAA) came into operation.6 The dual system of law created under the BAA established a separate and
inferior system of justice for Africans and left the common law
system of justice for all other South Africans. The BAA was
designed to be comprehensive in reach, regulating administrative, judicial, and substantive matters such as the appointment
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of chiefs; the establishment of courts and their jurisdiction; and
the determination of legal status, land registration and tenure,
marriage, and succession. More generally, the BAA was the
primary instrument for entrenching a uniform system of indirect
rule in South Africa whereby traditional leaders became state
agents in administering the affairs of those over whom they were
appointed to rule.7

when applicable, “subject to the Constitution and any legislation
that specifically deals with customary law.”
These constitutional provisions are collectively read as having sewn the roots for the rebirth of African customary law and
making it an integral and coequal part of the South African legal
system. It has thus been on this constitutional platform that
developments and reforms in customary law have taken place.
Before considering these reforms and developments, the paper
briefly discusses Professor Mamdani’s thesis of how decentralized despotism, as one of the main defining features of colonial
rule relative to customary law, has shaped the post-independence
reform to this body of law.

The BAA was an effective piece of legislation insofar as
achieving its purpose to entrench the divide between black and
white in South Africa. The BAA empowered native commissioners and traditional leaders to act with few limits, leaving little
room to doubt that customary law was indeed an inferior system
of law that took more than it gave to those subject to its jurisdiction.8 The egregiousness of the BAA ultimately undermined and
brought into question the very legitimacy of traditional authority
and customary law.

Decentralized Despotism, Then and Now
In his highly regarded and equally provocative book, Citizen
and Subject, Mamdani focuses on the role, function, and structure of native authorities and customary law within the colonial
state.13 He calls the state form that colonial powers established
for dealing with the native question a “decentralized despotism.”
According to Mamdani, the colonial state was bifurcated:14 on
the one hand, a centrally organized polity with rights and liberties, ruled directly by an appointed or elected governor almost
invariably for white settlers;15 on the other, a decentralized
native state inhabited by indigenous Africans or natives with few
or no rights and liberties, ruled indirectly via chiefs appointed
and maintained by the colonial administration.16

Rebirth of Customary Law under the
Constitutional Dispensation
Due to customary law’s tainted colonial history, at the time
of post-apartheid constitutional negotiations, it was far from a
foregone conclusion that customary law would become South
Africa’s constitutionally-ordained “other” system of law. Many
were skeptical of the constitutional appropriateness of maintaining a dual legal system, especially as customary law was
primarily applicable to one racial grouping. Moreover, skeptics
criticized the traditional structures that were an integral part
of its operation as undemocratic.9 Despite prevailing concerns
and misgivings, it was decided that there were ample justifications to continue recognizing customary law and even grant it
new elevated status. Firstly, there was the need to incorporate
on an equal basis a legal system rooted in African cultural
traditions. Secondly, a majority of South Africans identified
and conducted their lives in accordance with customary law.
Thirdly, there was already a functioning customary legal system that could become part of the state’s justice and administrative infrastructure.10

The core concept underlying the decentralized despotic state
was the establishment of a second-tier legal and administrative
order focused on asserting power over and control of the African
population.17 To create this state form, the colonial power needed
to establish institutional and political control over traditional
authorities by developing a system of indirect rule that “created
a dependent but autonomous state system of rule, one that combined accountability to superiors with a flexible response to the
subject population, a capacity to implement central directives
with one to absorb local shocks.”18 Second, the colonial power
needed a second-tier legal and administrative order to maintain
social control. Mamdani explains that “[c]ustomary law was not
about guaranteeing rights, it was about enforcing custom. Its
point was not to limit power, but to enable it.”19

These justifications display a profound appreciation for the
cultural significance of customary law. In particular, supporters
of customary law’s incorporation into the Constitution perceived
its potential to contribute to the mainstreaming of African
culture and values into South Africa’s legal system. Professor
Bennett, a leading customary law scholar, has asserted that from
a constitutional point of view “the recognition and application
of customary law . . . rests on the right to culture.”11 In support
of this view, he points out that the South African Bill of Rights
contains two distinct cultural rights provisions. Section 30 recognizes the right to use language and participate in the cultural
life of one’s choice, characterized as an individual right, while
Section 31 recognizes the right of persons belonging to cultural,
religious, or linguistic communities to enjoy their cultural practices, generally characterized as a collective right. Although
these provisions make no reference to customary law, both are
generally accepted as supporting the incorporation of customary
law into the Constitution as they afford all South Africans the
right to participate in and enjoy a cultural life of their choice.12
Finally, Section 211(3) requires courts to apply customary law

Mamdani points out that, although the colonial powers
realized the potential for certain customs to interfere with the
colonial enterprise, the colonial state did not concern itself with
determining the actual content of customary law. Instead, the
colonialists co-opted and controlled traditional authorities in
whom they conferred powers to decide the content of customary
law.20 Despite having lost their original autonomy and power
base, the traditional authorities were able to focus on dispensing
customary justice with full knowledge that any challenge to their
powers would be met with the might of the colonial state.21
Therefore, according to Mamdani, this particular legacy of
colonialism — decentralized despotism — informed how the
post-independence state developed its urban-rural/common
law-customary law divide. This divide goes way beyond the geographical or spatial; in many ways, it can represent the politics
of inclusion and exclusion within a particular polity, much like
32
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it established and formalized the requirements for a valid customary marriage, including the formalities of registration.25 In
addition, in the context of the customary marriage, it declared
that women were equal to their husbands for all purposes where
previously they were regarded as perpetual minors.26 The statute
also made all customary marriages automatically in community of property,27 with the exception of marriages entered into
before RCMA’s commencement.28 Finally, the RCMA rendered
the dissolution of a customary marriage actionable only via high
court proceedings.29
The reform of the customary law of succession was necessitated by the Constitutional Court case Bhe v Magistrate,
Khayelitsha and Others,30 which declared unconstitutional the
customary law principle of male primogeniture. Under the customary principle, the eldest male descendant of the deceased
always stood to inherit to the exclusion of all females (including the wife) and younger surviving males. After Bhe and the
RCSA, the surviving wife and all the deceased’s children are
entitled to inherit their share as determined by the Intestate
Succession Act 81 of 1987. The RCSA, amongst other things,
stipulates who may inherit after an intestate death by departing
from the concept of dependents who may inherit in the traditional African family structure.

Photograph of artwork at the South African Constitutional Court.

racial identity determined who was a citizen versus a subject of
the colonial state.22
While not accepting Mamdani’s thesis wholesale, much that
he says about the inherited colonial legacy merits consideration
as one reflects upon recent customary law developments in
South Africa. In particular, if one uses Mamdani’s concept of
decentralized despotism as a tool of analysis to consider the
extent to which customary law reforms may perpetuate a colonial legacy by continuing customary law and institutions as regulatory top-down instruments that enable administrative control
rather than as a rights-conferring and -reinforcing system of law
that fosters democracy and citizen participation.

Beyond legally reforming customary law, these statutes
have gone a long way towards changing the substance of the
respective customary laws to now closely mirror their common
law counterparts.31 Apart from some idiosyncratic tinkering to
accommodate polygyny32 and defining customary law in the
widest of terms, there is now little substantive or procedural
difference from the common law when it comes to customary
marriage and succession.

While conceding that the term despotism may not be the
most appropriate and arguably could overstate the case, there is
value in using this concept: it more truly engages with the deeprooted political and institutional power dynamics that colonial
policy created when it deployed the decentralized despotic state
form as its preferred mode of governance.

The purpose of this paper is not to take umbrage with the
common law or with the act of reformation. Rather, it is concerned with what reforms such as the ones described above do
to further ossify perceptions of the inferiority of customary law
vis-à-vis the common law, especially when one considers that
the Constitution ostensibly creates a dual legal system. What
is objectionable is not the idea of reform but that this type of
substitution is termed a reform of customary law.

Reflection on Major Developments in
Customary Law

If one accepts that the continuing relevance of customary
law is rooted in the constitutional rights to culture, as discussed
above, then how can these reforms be justified if at heart they
substitute common law, arguably with its own cultural orientation, for customary law? A knee-jerk response may be the
so-called “reforms promote the right to equality.” This misses
the point, however, for the right to equality derives from the
Constitution and not the common law, and the Constitution
envisages that customary law will be subject to its terms and not
those of common law.

The primary aim of this section is to reflect upon both substantive and institutional developments in the area of customary
law since its incorporation into the current constitutional state.

Substantive Developments and the Enduring Primacy of
the Common Law
At the start of the current democratic dispensation, the customary laws of marriage and succession were ripe for reform,
since they were perceived as contributing to the subjugation
and subordination of women.23 The result was to enact the
Recognition of the Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998
(RCMA) and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and
Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 (RSCA) as read
with the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. The RCMA provided for the official recognition of customary marriages, both
monogamous and polygamous, and affected marriages entered
into both before and after RCMA’s entry into force.24 Moreover,

Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, in a paper that sought to
encourage debate on the application of customary law, raise an
important question that resonates with the concerns discussed in
this paper.33 Concurring with the viewpoint that constitutional
recognition of customary law is premised on the right to culture,
the authors ask, “What customary law or version of customary
law was envisaged by the Constitution?”34 Was it the living/
unofficial or the state/official version of customary law?35 The
33
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If customary law is rightly conceptualized in
cultural terms, then there is a need to democratize
the way it is reformed so that those closest to it
have the ways and means to determine its content and
its relevance to their lives, or equally to reject it where
it no longer resonates with their sense of self.
authors came out emphatically on the side of living customary law.36 In the present context, this question urges us to ask
whether and how the reform process that substitutes common
law for customary law can be said to be upholding and promoting the right to culture. It appears that the reformers failed to
meaningfully engage with this important question. Surely the
aim of reform is to engage with customary law on its own terms
in order to arrive at a more constitutionally compliant version
rather than to simply replace it with laws that are culturally disconnected from those who live under customary law.

More generally, the extent to which the Traditional Courts
Bill sought to accommodate the interests of traditional authorities and grant them sweeping powers is concerning.41 As crafted,
the bill seemed to be centrally concerned with conferring power
on traditional authorities and enhancing their status, thus leading one to conclude that powerful political considerations were
driving the reforms at the expense of democratic principles and
equal citizenship.42 The bill’s failure to place the community at
the center of the scheme reconstituting traditional courts is most
troubling.43 If the traditional courts are to be reconstituted in a
manner that truly seeks to uphold democracy, then any future
bill must be organized in a way that clearly regards community
participation and interests as paramount. It would not be too farfetched to say that the bill in the format published placed traditional authority within the mold of a reformulated, decentralized
despotic state — only this time functioning within a non-racial,
inclusive democratic state.

Finally, simply terming a reform customary when its substance is quite clearly not perpetuates the view that customary
law continues to play a subordinate role in a tiered state legal
structure wherein customary law can be construed and deployed
in any manner that suits the needs and convenience of the incumbent government. This approach is simply untenable because
it tends to detract from the promise of the Constitution, which
provides South Africa’s citizens the right to attain and enjoy full
citizenship by expressing their cultural rights and conducting
their affairs in terms of customary law.

Conclusion
Political observers must take care not to make categorical
declarations of failure or success so early in South Africa’s
democratic project. This caveat, however, should not prevent us
from evaluating how far South African society has come and
where it appears to be going. The sound way forward is to seek
guidance from others who have traversed a similar path, such as
other former colonies, if only to learn from their mistakes.

Institutional Developments: Problems with Traditional
Courts
Fifteen years after the commencement of the democratic era,
the BAA has still not been repealed in full, although not for want
of trying. Commencing in 2005, five repeal acts have sought
to do this but failed.37 The main barrier is that Parliament has
failed to deliver legislation on traditional courts, despite the fact
that the South African Law Commission started this project in
199638 and produced a draft bill for Parliament to consider as
far back as 2003.39

Where customary law is concerned, there is a need to promote constitutional imperatives. There is also a need, however,
to ensure that the changes are not delivered in a non-inclusive,
top-down fashion that treats customary law and its institutions as
outsiders and allows mechanisms of administration and control
to be used by whomsoever is in power. Much care must be taken
to ensure that in reforming customary law, we are not reproducing the bifurcated state form and decentralized despotism characteristic of a bygone era.

In 2008, Parliament did introduce a Traditional Courts Bill,
however in spite of vocal support from the numerous bodies representing traditional leaders40 and the Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development, the bill failed to garner the necessary votes in Parliament. The bill’s problems were numerous,
including that it envisioned a return to the primacy of traditional
authorities strongly reminiscent of colonial times, and that it further marginalized rural women by leaving representation on the
courts comprised mainly of hereditary male traditional leaders.

If customary law is rightly conceptualized in cultural terms,
then there is a need to democratize the way it is reformed so that
those closest to it have the means to determine its content and its
relevance to their lives, or equally to reject it where it no longer
resonates with their sense of self. Failing this, customary law
34

Sibanda: When Is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on Customary Law under
may continue to be an incredible edifice rooted in its colonial
legacy that perpetuates marginalization and exclusion of some
confined to its strictures who remain subjects and sometime citi-

zens. Such a system that forces some members of the population
to remain prisoners of an oppressive past should not be allowed
to prevail unquestioned.		
HRB

Endnotes: When Is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on Customary Law under South Africa’s
Constitutional Dispensation
1

15

A dual legal system is one in which the state officially recognizes two different systems of law as applying within its territory
at the same time. During the colonial period, these systems were
the common law that applied to whites and African customary
law that applied to blacks. According to van Niekerk, these “two
officially recognized systems run parallel and interact in limited
prescribed circumstances.” See G.J. van Niekerk, Legal Pluralism, in
Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 5, 6 (J.C. Bekker,
C. Rautenbach and N.M.I. Goolam, eds., 2nd ed. 2006). For a different conception see also Lesala L. Mofokeng, Legal Pluralism in
South Africa: Aspects of customary, Muslim and Hindu Family law
(Hatfield, Pretoria: Vanshaik, 2009).
2
Although there is a general tendency in academic literature to
differentiate between colonialism and apartheid, this paper uses the
term colonialism to include apartheid because much of what commenced under colonialism with respect to customary law was simply
continued or modified under apartheid. See also Mahmood Mamdani,
Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism 27-29 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996).
3
See T.W. Bennett, Customary Law in South Africa 77 (Juta
2003). Section 211 (3) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 provides
that “the Courts must apply customary law when that law is
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any other legislation that
specifically deals with customary law.”
4
See Felicity Kaganas & Christina Murray, The Contest Between
Culture and Gender Equality Under South Africa’s Interim
Constitution, 21 J.L. & Soc’y 409 (1994); Chuma Himonga &
Craig Bosch, The Application of African Customary Law under the
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just beginning?,
117 S. Africa L.J. 306 (2000); T.W. Bennett, supra note 3, at 96-98.
5
See Mamdani, supra note 2.
6
See T.W. Bennett, A Sourcebook of African Customary Law
for Southern Africa, 55-63 (Juta 1991); see also P.K. Rakate, The
Status of Traditional Courts under the Final Constitution, Comp.
Int’l L. J. of S. Afr. 175, 179-184 (1997).
7
In section one of the BAA, the State President was appointed
as Supreme Chief, in which capacity he or she had the right to
recognize, appoint, and dismiss all other chiefs within the territory
of South Africa. The major effect was that the traditional chiefs no
longer required their subjects’ recognition and acceptance to enjoy
legitimacy. Instead, they only required state recognition to be legitimate.
8
See Khanya Motshabi & Shireen G. Volks, Towards Democratic
Chieftaincy: Principles and Procedures, in Acta Juridica 106 (1991).
9
Id. at 109.
10 See Kaganas & Murray, supra note 4.
11 T.W. Bennett, supra note 3, at 78.
12
Id. These rights are subject to the important proviso that the
rights may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with the Bill of
Rights.
13 Mamdani, supra note 2.
14 Id. at 16-18.

Id. at 109.
Id.
17 Id. at 109-10.
18 Mamdani, supra note 2, at 60.
19 Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
20 Id. at 115-17.
21 Id. at 122-23.
22 Id. at 61. (“To stretch reality, but without stepping outside of the
bounds of the real, the Africa of free peasants is trapped in a nonracial version of apartheid. What we have before us is a bifurcated
world, no longer simply racially organized, but a world in which the
dividing line between those human and those less human is a line
between those who labor on the land and those who do not. This
divided world is inhabited by subjects on the one side and citizens
on the other; their life is regulated by customary law on one side and
modern law on the other; their beliefs are dismissed as pagan on this
side but bear the status of religion on the other; the stylized moments
in their day-to-day lives are considered ritual on this side and culture
on the other; their creative activity is considered crafts on this side
and glorified as arts on the other; their verbal communication is
demeaned as vernacular chatter on this side, but elevated as linguistic
discourse on the other; in sum the world of the ‘savages’ barricaded,
in deed as in word, from the world of the ‘civilized.’”).
23
See generally Chuma Himonga, The Advancement of African
Women’s Rights in the First Decade of Democracy in South Africa:
The Reform of the Customary Law of Marriage and Succession, in
Acta Juridica 82 (2005). See also T.W. Bennett, supra note 3, at 96.
24
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 § 2
[RCMA].
25 Id. §§ 3, 4.
26 Id. § 6.
27
“In community of property” means that both spouse’s separate
assets and liabilities from before the marriage become part of the
joint marital estate, of which both spouses are joint owners with equal
rights.
28
RCMA, supra note 24, § 7. The effect of this was that women
married in terms of customary law did not enjoy the benefit of being
equal to their spouses as far as matrimonial property was concerned.
For all intents and purposes, as far as matrimonial property was concerned, it was as if the RCMA had never been passed. This position
has been changed recently by the Constitutional Court in Gumede v
President of South Africa 2008 (23) SA (CC) (S. Afr.) wherein all
monogamous customary law marriages were declared to be in community of property irrespective of when they were entered into.
29 RCMA, supra note 24, § 8.
30 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
31
For example, the RCMA has changed the nature of customary
marriage (and the dissolution thereof) from essentially a private affair
between two or more families into a public one that now requires
registration; whilst the requirements for a valid marriage are now the
16

Endnotes continued on page 82
35

